When the State Returns to the Territory: Medellín’s Lesson for Ecuador

From the world’s most violent city to a reference point in urban security. Medellín’s story is once again entering the regional conversation as Ecuador searches for ways to confront the rise of organized crime.

In the early 1990s, Medellín was known internationally for a relentless tragedy. In 1991 the city recorded 6,349 homicides, the highest number in its history. The rate reached 381 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest ever documented in a major city.

Car bombings tied to the drug trade, targeted assassinations and clashes between armed groups defined an entire generation. In many hillside neighborhoods, particularly in areas such as Comuna 13, the state had little real presence. Criminal organizations set the rules, controlled illicit economies and recruited young people.

Three decades later, the city’s trajectory looks very different. Medellín, which once registered more than 6,300 killings in a single year and one of the highest violence rates in the world, closed 2025 with 346 homicides. That represents a rate of roughly 13 per 100,000 inhabitants, according to figures from the city government. The decline exceeds 90 percent compared with the peak years of the 1990s and has turned Medellín into one of the most frequently cited examples in Latin America of how a city can reclaim territory when the state combines security policy, social investment and international cooperation.

This transformation did not rest on a single policy. It emerged from several reinforcing elements: stronger institutions, sustained social investment in the most vulnerable neighborhoods, the recovery of public space and international cooperation on security.

International cooperation and institutional strengthening

During the 2000s Colombia advanced an institutional strengthening strategy known as Plan Colombia, a cooperation framework with the United States and other partners aimed at confronting drug trafficking and organized crime.

The initiative included intelligence support, technological modernization, training for security forces and reforms designed to strengthen the judicial system.

“Most cooperation programs operate across multiple levels, which is reflected in the operational development of the fight against drugs and transnational threats,” Colombia’s Ministry of Defense said in a statement cited by The Washington Post.

Over time, these efforts helped expand investigative capacity, improve coordination between institutions and develop new strategies to dismantle criminal networks.

Medellín: security with social investment

In Medellín, however, the strategy extended beyond policing. City authorities chose to pair security policies with sustained social investment in the neighborhoods most affected by violence.

One of the most emblematic projects was the Metrocable, a cable car system integrated into the city’s metro network that connected hillside communities long isolated from the urban center.

For thousands of residents in the comunas, the system represented more than mobility. It opened access to jobs, education and public services.

Another symbol of the city’s transformation was the creation of 26 library parks, cultural centers built in areas that had long been dominated by armed groups. The premise behind these projects was simple but powerful: security is not built through police operations alone. It also requires opportunity.

The debate Ecuador now faces

In that context, Colombia’s experience is frequently invoked in regional debates about security. In Colombia, security cooperation agreements developed within constitutional procedures and under institutional oversight, helping preserve a balance between international collaboration, national sovereignty and democratic accountability.

In Ecuador, however, the discussion unfolds within a particularly strict constitutional framework. Article 5 of the 2008 Constitution declares the country a territory of peace and states that “the establishment of foreign military bases or foreign facilities for military purposes shall not be permitted.”

For years that principle has shaped Ecuador’s approach to military cooperation and national sovereignty.

Yet the country has undergone a dramatic shift in recent years. Ecuador, once considered one of the safer countries in Latin America, now faces one of the most severe security crises in its recent history. In 2025 the country recorded 9,216 intentional homicides, the highest figure on record, averaging 25 killings a day, almost one every hour, according to data released by the Ministry of the Interior and the National Police.

The escalation has been swift. Less than a decade ago Ecuador maintained one of the lowest homicide rates in the region. But the expansion of drug trafficking networks and competition between criminal organizations has reshaped the landscape. Between 2020 and 2023 homicides multiplied several times, pushing the rate to roughly 45 per 100,000 inhabitants.

By 2025 the trend had intensified further. Security assessments estimate the country closed the year with a rate near 51 homicides per 100,000 people, the highest in its modern history and among the highest in the hemisphere.

Cooperation and the rule of law

Medellín’s experience highlights an uncomfortable reality in Latin American security debates: the problem is rarely only about policing. It is fundamentally about the state. When the state retreats from a territory, organized crime fills the vacuum. When it returns with institutions, international cooperation and democratic oversight, the balance shifts. That is, ultimately, the dilemma Ecuador now faces.